How the Sentencing Commission Does and Does Not Matter in \u3ci\u3eBeckles v. United States\u3c/i\u3e by Litman, Leah M. & Beasley, Luke C.
 
(33) 
ESSAY 
HOW THE SENTENCING COMMISSION DOES AND DOES 
NOT MATTER IN BECKLES V. UNITED STATES 
LEAH M. LITMAN† & LUKE C. BEASLEY‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
Two years ago, in Johnson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that 
the so-called “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is 
unconstitutionally vague.1 Last spring, the Court made this rule retroactive 
in Welch v. United States.2 Then in June, the Court granted certiorari in Beckles 
v. United States to resolve two questions that have split lower courts in the 
wake of Johnson and Welch: (1) whether an identically worded “residual clause” 
in a U.S. Sentencing Guideline—known as the career offender Guideline—is 
unconstitutionally void for vagueness; and (2) if so, whether the rule invalidating 
the Guideline’s residual clause applies retroactively.3 
The questions on which the Court granted certiorari in Beckles turn on 
how similar the ACCA and the Sentencing Guidelines are. Both the ACCA 
and the Sentencing Guidelines impose additional punishment on defendants 
with previous convictions for violent felonies,4 and both the ACCA and the 
Sentencing Guidelines define “violent felonies” to include any crime that 
“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”5 Those thirteen words are called the “residual clause,” in both the 
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1 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2555-63 (2015). 
2 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1263-68 (2016). 
3 136 S. Ct. 2510 (2016) (mem.). 
4 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). 
5 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2). 
34 University of Pennsylvania Law Review Online [Vol. 165: 33 
ACCA and the Sentencing Guidelines, and courts have interpreted this 
identical language the same way.6 
But the ACCA and the Guidelines trigger different kinds of penalties. 
The ACCA is a federal statute—enacted by Congress—that subjects defendants 
to mandatory minimum sentences and increases defendants’ statutory maximum 
sentences. With the ACCA’s residual clause, the statutory minimum sentence 
is fifteen years; without it, the statutory maximum sentence is ten years.7 
Accordingly, Johnson meant that prisoners whose sentences depended on the 
ACCA’s residual clause received sentences that were greater than the maximum 
sentence provided for by statute. 
In contrast, the Sentencing Guidelines are rules promulgated by the United 
States Sentencing Commission.8 Under the career offender Guideline, a 
defendant who has committed two prior violent felonies is subject to an 
offense-level enhancement, meaning a correspondingly higher sentencing 
range.9 The sentencing range, however, does not change a defendant’s statutory 
minimum or maximum sentence. While judges must sentence defendants 
within the sentencing range that is established by statute, judges are not 
required to sentence defendants within the sentencing range that is 
established by the Guidelines. Judges retain discretion to deviate from the 
sentencing range provided for by the Guidelines.10 Therefore, if Beckles 
invalidates the identically worded “residual clause” in the Sentencing 
Guidelines, prisoners whose sentences depended on the Guidelines’ residual 
clause could still receive the same sentence at resentencing. However, while 
judges are not required to sentence a defendant within the sentencing range 
established by the Guidelines, the Guidelines’ range has a significant impact 
on a defendant’s ultimate sentence.11 
 
6 Leah M. Litman, Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson’s Potential Ruling on 
ACCA’s Constitutionality, 115 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 55, 64 & n.46 (2015). 
7 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (mandating the fifteen-year minimum for those previously 
convicted of violent felonies), with id. § 924(a)(2) (fixing the maximum prison sentence at ten years). 
8 See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (noting that the Sentencing Commission 
drafts the sentencing guidelines and “the guidelines are the equivalent of legislative rules adopted 
by federal agencies”). 
9 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1 (setting the requirements for career 
offenders—including the conviction of previous violent felonies—and fixing corresponding criminal 
history categories). 
10 See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 820 (2010) (noting that United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220, 259 (2005), “rendered the [Sentencing] Guidelines advisory”); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1(c)(1) (stating that a court may not impose a sentence “greater than 
the statutorily authorized maximum sentence”); id. § 5G1.1(c)(2) (stating that a court may not 
impose a sentence that is “less than any statutorily required minimum sentence”). 
11 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Scholars of Criminal Law, Federal Courts, and Sentencing in 
Support of Petitioner at 12, Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2016) (“Although 
the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, they have considerable influence on sentencing 
determinations because of the procedures courts must follow in imposing sentence.”). 
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This short Essay considers how significant the differences between the 
ACCA and the Guidelines are, and how important the Sentencing 
Commission should be to Beckles’s resolution of the retroactivity question. 
Some of the differences between the ACCA and the Guidelines also may be 
relevant to whether the career offender Guideline’s residual clause, like the 
ACCA’s residual clause, is unconstitutional.12 But this Essay focuses on whether 
the differences between the ACCA and the Guidelines matter to the second 
question the Court is poised to address in Beckles—namely whether a rule 
invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause applies retroactively, rather than 
whether the Guideline’s residual clause should be invalidated. 
There are two ways in which the Sentencing Commission might affect the 
retroactivity question. One way would be if the Guidelines promulgated by 
the Commission frequently affect defendants’ sentences. An important 
difference between the ACCA and the Guidelines is that judges are required 
to sentence defendants within the range established by the ACCA, but they 
are not required to sentence defendants within the range established by the 
Guidelines. But that difference should not matter much if judges routinely 
sentence defendants within the range established by the Guidelines. As it 
happens, there is good evidence that a defendant’s sentence changes 
dramatically depending on whether a court is allowed to impose a sentence 
by relying on the Guideline’s residual clause. Every court of appeals, except 
for the Eleventh Circuit, has either held that the Guideline’s residual clause 
is invalid or assumed that it is. And the resentencings that have occurred have 
resulted in dramatically lower sentences. 
The experience in the courts of appeals confirms that judges routinely 
sentence defendants within the range established by the Guidelines. But 
more importantly for the question in Beckles, the experience makes perfectly 
clear that a defendant’s sentence changes dramatically depending on whether 
a court can sentence a defendant under the Guideline’s residual clause. And 
because a rule invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause affects defendants’ 
sentencing outcomes, whatever finality interests exist in defendants’ 
sentences are outweighed by the profound effects that a rule invalidating the 
Guideline’s residual clause has on the terms of imprisonment defendants 
actually serve. Accordingly,  a rule invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause 
should apply retroactively on collateral review. 
There is also a second way in which the Sentencing Commission might 
affect whether the Court will retroactively apply a rule invalidating the 
Guideline’s residual clause. When the Supreme Court decides whether to 
apply a rule retroactively, it occasionally considers the burden that would 
 
12 See United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1193-96 (11th Cir. 2015) (relying on differences between 
statutes and the Guidelines to conclude that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to the Guidelines). 
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result from doing so. If the Sentencing Commission thought it burdensome 
to retroactively apply a rule invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause, then 
the Commission’s views might be evidence that retroactively applying the 
rule actually would be burdensome. But here, the Sentencing Commission 
matters little because the Commission never even investigated the extent of 
any possible burden on the federal courts. 
This Essay proceeds in two parts. Part I argues that the resentencings in 
jurisdictions where the Guideline’s residual clause is invalid indicate that a 
rule invalidating the Guideline should apply retroactively. Part II argues that 
nothing the Commission has done suggests that it would be unduly burdensome 
to retroactively apply a rule invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause. 
I. THE IMPACT OF RESENTENCINGS 
Under Teague v. Lane, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure 
generally do not apply on collateral review.13 But new substantive rules of 
constitutional law do apply.14 The Supreme Court’s definition of substantive 
rules has evolved over time. Teague originally stated that a substantive rule is 
one that “places ‘certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond 
the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.’”15 But the 
Court’s most recent retroactivity cases have solidified a somewhat different 
definition of substantive rules: a rule is substantive if it “necessarily carries a 
significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law cannot 
impose upon him.”16 Included in that definition are rules that “narrow the 
scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its terms,”17 as well as rules 
concluding that “the Constitution itself deprives the State of the power to 
impose a certain penalty.”18 Last term, the Court held retroactive a rule that 
invalidated a criminal statute, which had imposed a mandatory minimum 
sentence and raised the statutory maximum sentence.19 And in Montgomery v. 
Louisiana, the Court made retroactive a rule that invalidated the mandatory 
imposition of life without parole on certain offenders (juveniles) but did not 
rule out the actual imposition of life without parole on those same offenders.20 
 
13 489 U.S. 288, 306-07 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
14 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 728 (2016) (“[C]ourts must give retroactive 
effect to new substantive rules of constitutional law.”). 
15 489 U.S. at 307 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
16 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)). 
17 Schriro, 542 U.S. at 351 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1998)). 
18 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989). 
19 Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1262, 1268 (2016). 
20 136 S. Ct. at 732-36. 
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There are many reasons why a rule invalidating the Guideline should 
apply retroactively. This Essay focuses on only one of them, in part because 
this particular reason has not been raised in any of the briefs in support of 
Mr. Beckles.21 That reason is: a rule invalidating the Guideline affects 
defendants’ sentencing outcomes, and under the Court’s recent decision in 
Montgomery, this means that the rule should apply retroactively. 
Montgomery is one of the most significant precedents for the retroactivity 
question in Beckles. It held retroactive a rule—announced in Miller v. 
Alabama22—that did not actually rule out the imposition of a particular sentence 
on certain defendants. Before Miller, juveniles could be sentenced to life 
without parole. The Court in Miller struck down a statute imposing a 
sentence of mandatory life without parole for certain offenders,23 but it left 
open the possibility that some juveniles could still be sentenced to life without 
parole.24 Therefore, the rule announced in Miller—and the rule Montgomery 
held retroactive—was that juveniles could not be sentenced to life without 
parole under a statute that mandated the imposition of this sentence, but they 
could be sentenced to life without parole by a court that had some discretion in 
imposing such a sentence.25 Miller and Beckles are thus parallel in this respect: in 
both cases, judges could impose the same sentences upon resentencing. 
Even though Miller did not foreclose the possibility that defendants could 
receive the same sentences upon resentencing, the Court held Miller 
retroactive,26 and the United States even argued for that result.27 The Court 
reasoned that Miller was retroactive because, while Miller did not rule out the 
imposition of life without parole, the result of Miller was that only “the rare 
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption” would receive 
life without parole.28 The United States pressed a similar argument in its 
 
21 See generally, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, Beckles v. United States, No. 15-8544 (U.S. Aug. 11, 
2016); Brief of the Federal Public and Community Defenders and the National Association of 
Federal Defenders as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Beckles, No. 15-8544 (U.S. Aug. 18, 
2016); Brief Amicus Curiae of Scholars of Criminal Law, Federal Courts, and Sentencing in Support 
of Petitioner, supra note 11. 
22 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
23 Id. at 2463-75. 
24 See id. at 2471 (“Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or 
type of crime . . . .”). 
25 Id. at 2475. 
26 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
27 See infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
28 Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. 
at 2469); see also id. at 726 (“Although Miller did not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to impose life 
without parole on a juvenile, the Court explained that a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate 
sentence for all but the rarest of children . . . .”); id. at 733 (“The Court [in Miller] recognized that 
a sentencer might encounter the rare juvenile offender who exhibits such irretrievable depravity that 
rehabilitation is impossible and life without parole is justified.” (emphasis added)). 
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amicus brief urging the Court to apply Miller retroactively. The United States 
maintained that the “experience post-Miller confirms that the Miller rule is 
substantive,” and then pointed to (among other things), the fact that “the 
federal juvenile offenders who have been resentenced under Miller”—all ten 
of them—“received sentences less severe than life imprisonment without 
parole.”29 
Interestingly, something similar has occurred in jurisdictions where courts 
have held that the Sentencing Guideline’s residual clause is invalid. After 
Johnson, every court of appeals, aside from the Eleventh Circuit, has held or 
assumed that the residual clause is invalid.30 When defendants have been 
resentenced in jurisdictions where the residual clause is invalid, they have 
uniformly received less severe sentences, as shown below. That is, offenders 
who have been resentenced under a rule invalidating the Guideline’s residual 
clause—that is, sentenced without the residual clause—have received sentences 
less severe than the sentences they received with the residual clause. And this 
has occurred in eight of the eleven circuits that have determined the residual 
clause is invalid. The same will likely occur in the other three circuits where 
defendants are awaiting resentencing because these defendants’ amended 
Guidelines ranges—without the career offender Guideline—are dramatically lower 
than the ranges they were initially given due to the career offender Guideline.31 
Turning to some specific cases, one set of defendants that span eight 
circuits—that is, a group of defendants which includes one defendant from 
each circuit that has conducted resentencings—have had their terms of 
imprisonment collectively reduced by 288 months (over twenty-four years): 
 
1. First Circuit 
Anthony Soto-Rivera: resentenced to 87 months of imprisonment instead of 
108 months.32 Soto-Rivera has appealed from resentencing.33 
 
 
 
 
29 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 17, 22, Montgomery, 136 S. 
Ct. 718 (2016) (No. 14-280); see also id. at 1a-3a (listing the ten sentences and their respective outcomes). 
30 See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 21, at 28 & n.7 (collecting cases). Since that brief was filed, 
the Seventh Circuit has also held that the Guideline’s residual clause is invalid. See United States v. 
Hurlburt, No. 14-3611, No. 15-1686, 2016 WL 4506717, at *3-7 (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016) (en banc). 
31 Given how many defendants are sentenced as career offenders—orders of magnitude more 
than ten, see Litman, supra note 6, at 74—we did not collect the outcomes of all resentencings. 
32 See United States v. Soto-Rivera, 811 F.3d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 2016); Amended Judgment at 2, 
United States v. Soto-Rivera, No. 3:13-0463 (D.P.R. July 28, 2016). 
33 Notice of Appeal, United States v. Soto-Rivera, No. 3:13-00463 (D.P.R. Aug. 4, 2016). 
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2. Second Circuit 
Lucian Petrillo: resentenced to 151 months of imprisonment instead of 188 
months.34 
3. Third Circuit 
Willis Duane Evans: resentenced to time served—and thus released after 153 
months of imprisonment—when the original sentence was 205 months of 
imprisonment.35 
4. Fifth Circuit 
Raymond Estrada: resentenced to 120 months of imprisonment instead of 188 
months.36 Estrada has appealed from resentencing.37 
5. Sixth Circuit 
Jesse J. Pawlak: resentenced to 71 months of imprisonment instead of 105 
months.38 
6. Eighth Circuit 
Chad Taylor: resentenced to 18 months of imprisonment instead of 37 
months.39 
7. Ninth Circuit 
Demarkus Dante Benavides: resentenced to 35 months of imprisonment 
instead of 87 months.40 
8. Tenth Circuit 
Nathaniel J. Smith: resentenced to 63 months of imprisonment instead of 120 
months.41 
 
34 See Petrillo v. United States, 147 F. Supp. 3d 9, 12 (D. Conn. 2015); Amended Judgment at 
1, United States v. Petrillo, No. 3:05-0312 (D. Conn. Jan. 29, 2016). 
35 See United States v. Evans, No. 2:02-0001, No. 2:14-171, 2015 WL 9480097, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 
29, 2015); Amended Judgment at 2, United States v. Evans, No. 1:02-0001 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2016). 
36 See Amended Judgment at 2, United States v. Estrada, No. 2:14-0681 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18, 
2015); Sentencing Transcript at 4, United States v. Estrada, No. 2:14-0681 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2015). 
37 Notice of Appeal, United States v. Estrada, No. 2:14-0681 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 21, 2015). 
38 See United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902, 903 (6th Cir. 2016); Minutes of Proceedings, 
United States v. Pawlak, No. 1:14-0305 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 16, 2016). 
39 See United States v. Taylor, 803 F.3d 931, 933 (8th Cir. 2015) (Colloton, J., dissenting); 
Amended Judgment at 2, United States v. Taylor, No. 4:13-0142-001 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 14, 2015). 
40 See United States v. Benavides, 617 F. App’x 790 (9th Cir. 2015); Amended Judgment at 2, 
United States v. Benavides, No. 4:13-0718 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2015). 
41 See United States v. Smith, 628 F. App’x 565, 566 (10th Cir. 2015); Amended Judgment at 2, 
United States v. Smith, No. 1:14-1136 (D.N.M. Nov. 9, 2015). 
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No matter how you slice the 288 months (24+ years) of imprisonment, the 
numbers underscore how much the Guidelines matter to defendants’ 
sentences. Each defendant received, on average, thirty-six months less 
imprisonment—three years less imprisonment—when sentenced without the 
residual clause, demonstrating the pull that the Guidelines exert on 
defendants’ sentences. Indeed, because the career offender Guideline 
recommends so much additional imprisonment, Willis Duane Evans was 
ordered released, as his new Guidelines range and sentence exceeded the time 
he had already served.42 
The same results are likely to follow in the three circuits where defendants 
are awaiting potential resentencing.43 The sheer disparity between the new 
and old Guideline ranges for these defendants strongly suggests that they too 
will have their terms of imprisonment dramatically reduced: 
 
1. Fourth Circuit 
Jolon Devon Carthorne, Sr.: Guidelines range with the career offender 
designation: 322–387 months of imprisonment. Guidelines range without the 
career offender designation: 181–211 months of imprisonment. Actual 
sentence: 300 months of imprisonment (downward departure for acceptance 
of responsibility).44 Carthorne sought to amend his sentence on the theory 
that the Guideline’s residual clause was invalid under Johnson, but the district 
court rejected his claim.45 He has since sought a certificate of appealability 
from the Fourth Circuit.46 
 
42 See United States v. Evans, No. 2:02-0001, No. 2:14-171, 2015 WL 9480097, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 
29, 2015) (discussing how the advisory range is now calculated and applying it to Evans). 
43 Because other provisions of the career offender Guideline remain valid, not all defendants 
sentenced as career offenders must be resentenced if the career offender Guideline’s residual clause 
is held invalid. For example, the career offender Guideline imposes additional punishment where a 
defendant has prior convictions for violent felonies or controlled substance offenses. U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.1(a) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). The 
provision imposing punishment based on controlled substance offenses remains valid. So too do 
other definitions of “violent felonies” aside from the residual clause. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4B1.2(a)(2) (defining “crime of violence” to include, inter alia, “burglary 
of a dwelling, arson, or extortion”). For further explanation, see Leah M. Litman, Resentencing in the 
Shadow of Johnson v. United States, 28 FED. SENT’G REP. 45, 46-47 (2015) (detailing how Johnson 
does not directly affect sentences resulting from the application of the enumerated offense, element 
of force, or serious drug offense clauses). 
44 United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 508-09 (4th Cir. 2013). 
45 Carthorne v. United States, No. 1:10-96-1, No. 1:14-447 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 20, 2015) (recommending 
denial of the motion to vacate sentence); see also Carthorne v. United States, No. 1:10-96-1, No. 1:14-447 
(M.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2016) (adopting the magistrate’s recommendation). 
46 Memorandum of Supporting Facts and Request for Certificate of Appealability, Carthorne 
v. United States, No. 16-6515 (4th Cir. May 10, 2016). In United States v. Frazier, the Fourth Circuit 
“assume[d] without deciding” that the Guideline’s residual clause was invalid but declined to order 
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2. Seventh Circuit 
Myron Zollicoffer: Guidelines range with the career offender designation: 262–327 
months of imprisonment. Guidelines range without the career offender 
designation: 92–115 months of imprisonment. Actual sentence: 230 months 
of imprisonment.47 Zollicoffer has moved to amend his sentence on the 
theory that the Guideline’s residual clause is invalid under Johnson.48 
3. D.C. Circuit 
Dante Sheffield: Guidelines range with the career offender designation: 360 
months of imprisonment–life imprisonment. Guidelines range without the 
career offender designation: 92–115 months of imprisonment. Actual 
sentence: 230 months of imprisonment.49 The D.C. Circuit has remanded 
Sheffield’s case for resentencing, finding the Guideline’s residual clause 
invalid under the reasoning of Johnson.50 
Again, no matter how you slice the numbers, they are striking. These three 
defendants together received terms of imprisonment that are 319 months 
longer—more than twenty-six years longer—than the top of their Guidelines 
ranges without the career offender designation. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit 
observed that Mr. Sheffield “was sentenced to double the top of the Guidelines 
range he otherwise would have faced.”51 
Should the experience in these circuits be relevant? We believe so. Without 
expanding on that belief in great detail, we highlight what the United States 
said in its own brief in Montgomery, when it made a similar claim: 
The Teague principles balance the respect accorded to a final judgment and 
the interest in fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings. The Court has 
explained that procedural rules generally do not apply retroactively because 
the interest in finality outweighs the speculative effect of the new rule on a 
conviction or sentence. 
Substantive rules, in contrast, apply retroactively because their effects on 
the fairness of a defendant’s conviction or sentence are sufficiently profound 
to justify upsetting final judgments. The Court has observed that the 
 
resentencing because it concluded that the error did not affect the defendant’s sentence—a finding 
based, in part, on the fact that the district court varied upward to the statutory maximum sentence. 
See 621 F. App’x 166, 168-69 (4th Cir. 2015). 
47 See Amended Motion to Vacate Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, at 2, Zollicoffer v. United 
States, No. 3:15-03337 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2016). 
48 Id. at 4-18. The Seventh Circuit has since held the Guideline’s residual clause invalid. See United 
States v. Hurlburt, No. 14-3611, No. 15-1686, 2016 WL 4506717, at *3-7 . (7th Cir. Aug. 29, 2016) (en banc). 
49 See United States v. Sheffield, No. 12-3013, 2016 WL 4254995, at *11 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 12, 2016). 
50 Id. at *13-15. 
51 Id. at *13. 
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substantive rules it has recognized “necessarily carry a significant risk that a 
defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him,” and 
that risk is sufficient to overcome a State’s interests in finality and comity. 
The same reasoning applies to Miller. Although the Court did not 
preclude a life-without-parole sentence . . ., the Court expected that . . . life 
without parole would be an “uncommon” sentence . . . . [T]he federal 
experience proves this point . . . .52 
Applied to Beckles, the argument is just as straightforward. If the Court 
invalidates the Guideline’s residual clause, the risk that defendants received 
additional punishment—years in prison—because they were sentenced under 
the invalid Guideline provision is sufficient to overcome the interest in finality.53 
 
52 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 29, at 21-22 
(citations omitted). Arguing that a rule invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause is not 
substantive, the United States hedged on the argument it made in Montgomery: “Although in any 
given case procedural rules may have a significant effect on the outcome, a violation of those rules 
does not mean that any prisoner is serving a sentence that is not legally authorized or change the 
statutory range.” Brief for the United States as Respondent at 20, No.15-8544, Beckles v. United 
States (U.S. Sept. 19, 2016). The United States then listed several procedural rules, such as the “rule 
requiring defense counsel to warn a defendant about the immigration consequences of pleading 
guilty,” id. at 32, and maintained:  
Each of those important procedural rules undoubtedly exerts a significant 
effect on findings of guilt or the imposition of capital punishment in many 
cases. . . . The only difference here is that the effect of a lower advisory 
Guidelines range on actual sentences can more readily be shown through 
statistics. But that more easily documentable effect does not render 
petitioner’s asserted rule any more substantive . . . . 
Id. at 32.   
This framing differs from the United States’ claim that a rule may be substantive, rather than 
procedural, because the rule results in different sentencing outcomes. Moreover, the United States 
previously maintained that rules were procedural because they had only “speculative effect[s]” on a 
conviction or sentence, whereas now it maintains that even “documentable effects” are not sufficient. 
The United States’ new argument also overlooks how the Guidelines function as substantive law 
imposing punishment in a way that is not true for the other rules or procedures the Court invalidated 
and the United States identified. See id. at 26-28 (listing rules). The Guidelines specify additional 
prison time for punitive reasons, whereas the other rules the United States identified concerned 
advice to criminal defendants or the manner in which testimonial evidence may be presented at trial. 
The Guidelines—in particular the career offender Guideline—also differ from instructions at capital 
sentencings. The application of the career offender Guideline subjects a defendant to the maximum 
criminal history category, whereas any one component in a jury instruction does not automatically 
yield a particular sentencing outcome or range for a defendant. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 4B1.1(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (“A career offender’s criminal history 
category in every case under this subsection shall be Category VI.”). And “the Guidelines are in a 
real sense the basis for the [defendants’] sentence[s]” in a way that jury instructions are not. Peugh 
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013) (quoting Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 
2692 (2011) (plurality opinion) (emphasis removed)). 
53 See, e.g., Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (stating that substantive rules 
“necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant . . . faces a punishment that the law cannot 
impose upon him” (citation omitted)). 
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Although defendants could receive the same sentences after Beckles (without 
the career offender Guideline) that they received before Beckles (when they 
were sentenced under the career offender Guideline), that result would be 
“uncommon,” as the above examples illustrate. Those examples show that a 
rule invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause has “profound” effects on 
defendants’ actual sentences.54 Therefore, a rule invalidating the Guideline’s 
residual clause should apply retroactively. 
II. THE IMPACT OF THE SENTENCING COMMISSION’S (IN)ACTION 
The resentencing outcomes for defendants sentenced under the Guideline’s 
residual clause highlight the importance of the Sentencing Commission to 
defendants’ terms of imprisonment. 
But the Sentencing Commission is less significant to another aspect of 
Beckles. When the Supreme Court has analyzed whether to apply a rule 
retroactively, it has, at times, considered the effect on the criminal justice 
system of doing so. For example, when the Court in Montgomery made 
retroactive the rule invalidating mandatory imposition of life without parole 
on juveniles, the Court explained, “Extending parole eligibility to juvenile 
offenders does not impose an onerous burden on the States . . . .”55 
The Sentencing Commission could hypothetically have a claim to assessing 
the burden imposed by retroactively applying a rule invalidating the 
Guideline’s residual clause. Before the Court decided to hear Beckles and to 
resolve whether the Guideline’s residual clause is unconstitutional, the 
Sentencing Commission issued an amendment deleting the Guideline’s 
residual clause.56 But the Commission made the amendment deleting the 
Guideline’s residual clause effective August 1, 2016.57 That means the 
amended career offender Guideline—the version that does not include the 
residual clause—only applies to sentencings that are conducted after August 1, 
2016.58 In other words, the amendment is not “retroactive”; it does not apply to 
convictions that became final before August 2016. Indeed, the amendment does 
 
54 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 29, at 21-22. 
55 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016). 
56 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENT TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2 (2016), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/ 
20160121_RF.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7DD-3PFD]. 
57 Id. at ii. 
58 The Guidelines direct courts to apply the version of the Guidelines “in effect on the date the 
defendant is sentenced” unless doing so “would violate the ex post facto clause of the United States 
Constitution,” in which case the court is to use the Guidelines Manual “in effect on the date that the 
offense of conviction was committed.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.11 (U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014). Because the Guideline amendment deleting the residual clause imposes 
less punishment than the prior version of the Guideline, courts could apply the amendment to defendants 
who committed their offenses prior to the amendment, but were sentenced after the amendment. 
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not even apply to cases that have not yet become final if sentencing occurred 
prior to August 2016. 
The Sentencing Commission could have chosen to make the amendment 
retroactive. The Sentencing Commission has the authority to make a Guideline 
amendment retroactive.59 It has chosen to make retroactive some recent 
amendments that reduced the term of imprisonment recommended in 
Guidelines applicable to certain drug offenses.60 And when the Commission 
decides whether to give a Guideline amendment retroactive application, the 
Sentencing Guidelines direct the Commission to consider “the difficulty 
of applying [an] amendment retroactively.”61 Therefore, the Commission’s 
decision not to make retroactive the amendment deleting the Guideline’s 
residual clause could be seen as evidence that such retroactive application 
would be burdensome. 
But in this case, the Sentencing Commission’s own choice about 
retroactivity is not particularly good evidence of how burdensome it might 
be for the Supreme Court to make a rule invalidating the Guideline’s residual 
clause retroactive. That is, in part, because the Sentencing Commission opted 
not to investigate the possibility of making its amendment retroactive at all—a 
decision that appears to have been based on incomplete reasoning and 
supposition. For example, the Sentencing Commission merely observed that 
the process for determining which career offenders should be resentenced 
would be more difficult than the process used for the retroactive drug 
Guideline amendments.62 Administrability concerns were also raised when 
 
59 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), (u) (2012); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 1B1.10 cmt. background. The statutes and Guidelines refer to retroactivity as specifying that 
prisoners may have their terms of imprisonment reduced in light of a Guideline amendment that lowers 
the term of imprisonment recommended in the Guideline. But the Commission itself sometimes  
refers to this as retroactivity. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: 
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE 2014 DRUG GUIDELINES AMENDMENT, http://www.ussc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/materials-on-2014-drug-guidelines-amendment/20140724 
_FAQ_revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/2G5H-DRBK] (stating that changes in guideline ranges for drug 
trafficking offenses may allow for certain prisoners to have the changes applied retroactively). 
60 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 59 (detailing 
the retroactive application of these amendments). 
61 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.10 cmt. background. 
62 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, CHAIR REMARKS FOR PUBLIC MEETING 4 (Jan. 8, 2016), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20160108/ 
remarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERU2-FNHD] [hereinafter REMARKS] (statement of Hon. Patti B. 
Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n) (noting that sentencing documentation does not identify 
which provision led to the career offender designation or which criminal history events were counted 
as predicates, making it difficult to “identify cases in which the residual clause alone qualified an 
offender for the career offender provision”); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, PUBLIC MEETING 
MINUTES 6-7 (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-
and-meetings/20160108/meeting_minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/BC8V-C9QB] [hereinafter MINUTES] 
(highlighting similar issues); see also Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 153-55 (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
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the Commission investigated whether to apply the drug Guideline amendments 
retroactively, but after the Commission chose to apply the amendments 
retroactively, experience has shown that such fears did “not come to pass.”63 
Moreover, at the hearing about the career offender Guideline amendment, 
the Commission was informed that the number of career offender designations 
that depended on the residual clause—or even violent crimes, as opposed to 
controlled substance offenses—was “far fewer . . . than the thousands of 
defendants who got resentenced during” the drug Guideline amendments.64 
The testimony continued: “The numbers [of potential Beckles claims] are a 
lot smaller so the total burden is the same or less and the importance of it is 
even greater because the swings [from applying the career offender 
designation] are so great.”65 The chair noted in response only “[t]hat’s 
interesting” and “[w]e need to look at that.”66 It is not clear from the 
explanation or statements accompanying the Commission’s final 
amendments—which say nothing about the possible number of career 
offenders sentenced based on violent crimes, or the number of career offender 
designations that might depend on the residual clause—that they did look 
into the burden issue.67 
Additionally, some of the reasons the Commission gave for not making 
the Guideline amendment retroactive suggested it should have done so. For 
 
transcript_4.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VFR-JUNX] [hereinafter TRANSCRIPT] (statement of Hon. Patti 
B. Saris, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n) (“[O]n the retroactivity piece, drugs minus two was 
easy. . . . [L]et’s say you knock out . . . the residual clause. . . . It’s just not as simple as drugs. . . . It’s 
just more complicated.”). 
63 Public Hearing Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 65 (June 1, 2011), http://www.ussc.gov/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20110601/Hearing_Transcript.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7K9X-UEGE] (statement of Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender 
for the Eastern District of Virginia); see also Brief of Scholars of Federal Courts & Sentencing as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 28-30, Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (No. 
15-6418) (arguing that recent retroactive amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines did not present 
the administrability problems that were initially surmised). 
64 TRANSCRIPT, supra note 62, at 155 (statement of Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Nat’l Ass’n of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
65 Id. at 156 (statement of Zachary Margulis-Ohnuma, Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers). 
66 Id. (statement of Hon. Patti B. Saris); cf. id. at 37 (statement of Hon. Charles R. Breyer) 
(“I don’t think we are at a point know [sic] where we can make a determination as to what would be 
the impact of any changes . . . .”). 
67 See REMARKS, supra note 62, at 4 (stating without specification that “it is difficult, if not 
impossible to ascertain the overall effect” of giving retroactive application); see also MINUTES, supra 
note 62, at 6-7 (noting the potential difficulties of giving retroactive application without reference 
to any specific studies undertaken). The Criminal Law Committee deferred to the Commission on 
the issue of retroactivity because of incomplete information regarding the potential burden imposed 
by the resentencing process. See Testimony of Hon. Irene M. Keeley Presented to the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 
on Nov. 15, 2015, on Proposed Changes to Definitions of “Crime of Violence” and Related Issues 10-11, 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20151105/ 
Keeley.pdf [https://perma.cc/CE2F-MSET] (discussing the Committee’s reasons for deferring). 
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instance, the Commission’s decision not to make the residual clause’s deletion 
retroactive was based, in part, on its observation that the purpose of the 
amendment was “to address the litigation associated with the crime of 
violence definition in the career offender guideline.”68 At the same time, the 
Commission took note of the fact that “the very issue of retroactivity is 
already being litigated.”69 Presumably, making the amendment retroactive 
would have addressed this litigation, just as deletion of the residual clause 
addressed the litigation over that issue. 
CONCLUSION 
The Sentencing Guidelines and Sentencing Commission are both more 
and less significant to Beckles than one might expect. They are more significant 
because the experience with resentencings under the career offender 
Guideline highlights how much the Commission’s sentencing determinations 
affect defendants’ sentences. But they are less significant with respect to the 
extent of any difficulty that would ensue were the Court to make retroactive 
a rule invalidating the Guideline’s residual clause, because the Commission 
opted not to investigate the extent of any potential difficulty at all. 
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